



The Third Republic: Order and Progress in the Face of Hybrid War

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<http://dx.doi.org/10.47814/ijssrr.v8i11.3063>

Abstract

The Republic of Kosova declared its independence on February 17, 2008. It was a compromise between the right to self-determination and unification with its mother – the Republic of Albania and the geopolitical interests of the partners who contributed to its liberation from Serbian colonialism. In this study, we will shed light on the new political discourse in Kosova. The subject of the treatment is the new political platform promoted by the Vetëvendosje Movement, a force that could be qualified as a progressive left, built on three pillars: national sovereignty, social justice and civic democracy. Kosova is now going through the real process of state formation through what will be described by history as the 3rd Republic. This process requires a deeply progressive political culture, to be crowned without conflicting with the vital interests of the nation, but without harming the geopolitical interests of our Western partners. What unites Albanians with the Perednim, in this case specifically Kosova as part of the corpus of Albanian civilization, is the capacity for self-criticism and self-correction. In this plan, we conclude that the future of Albanians will not be determined only by external circumstances, but also by their ability to produce a sustainable, just and authentic governance model. Vetëvendosje has opened a path; the challenge is whether it can keep it open and turn it into a common path for the entire Albanian nation.

Keywords: *Modern State, 3rd Republic; Kosova, Self-Determination Movement Model; Political Culture; Hybrid War*

Introduction

The concept of the modern state is one of the central pillars of political theory and international law. Building on the foundations of the political thought of Bodin, Hobbes and Weber, the modern state is defined by its fundamental elements: people, territory, sovereignty, institutions and international recognition.

The history of nations is often the history of state-forming phases. Albanians, divided in different geopolitical spaces, have gone through several cycles of denied and recreated statehood. In this journey, the Republic of Kosova is not only a belated achievement, but also an intermediate step towards a larger project – the Albanian Federation. In this sense, Kosova is not the end of the Albanian state-forming process, but a political amalgam where national identity and institutional experience are combined, which opens the prospect of an equal union with Albania.

The Third Republic and the Vetevendosje¹ Movement Model

Kosova, since its declaration of independence in 2008, has been the scene of a long political transition, often characterized by painful international compromises, internal corruption, and the inability to build fully functional institutions. In this fraught landscape, the emergence and consolidation of the Vetevendosje Movement (VV) represented a political innovation. From an initial civic protest movement, VV managed to transform into the largest political force in Kosova and inaugurate a governance model that aims to break the old logic of transition politics.

This model, at its core, is a combination of political sovereignty, social justice, and civic democracy. If we are to view this endeavor in a theoretical framework, it is related to Jürgen Habermas' concept of the public sphere, [1] ²Antonio Gramsci's idea of cultural hegemony, and Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined communities.

Jürgen Habermas linked the hope for a free and just public sphere with the establishment of sound criticism arising from reason and rational action, which would then encourage the promotion of political culture and strong democratic institutions.

Meanwhile, in "The Study of Philosophy" Gramsci discussed the role of "common sense" - the dominant ideas about society and about our place in it - in the production of cultural hegemony³ [2], which will be one of the pillars on which the theoretical framework of the VV is built.

The essential question is: can this model be transformed into a pan-Albanian vision for the future, or will it remain simply a limited experiment in Kosova?

The possibility of the Third Republic functioning is also linked to this question, since it remains dependent on the VV's ability to realize its governing model.

The Vetevendosje Movement and the New Political Discourse

The Vetevendosje Movement, since its founding in 2005, has been affirmed as a force of protest against corruption, clientelism and external control over Kosova's sovereignty. It brought a new political discourse, which for the first time in the Albanian space was built on a platform on three pillars: national sovereignty, social justice and civic democracy.

In governance, especially after 2021, VV has attempted to transform this spirit into a governance model, with priorities such as: the fight against corruption, reforming the administration, increasing transparency, a social-democratic orientation towards equality and investments in strategic sectors (education, justice, digital economy).

1.Note: The political party in power in the Republic of Kosova is called the Vetevendosje Movement.

² Jürgen Habermas, *Ein neuer Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit und die deliberative Politik*, Berlin, 2023 [Botimi I fundit].

³ See more extensively Arlind Qori's doctoral thesis: <http://www.unitir.edu.al/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Doktoratura-Arlind-QoriFakulteti-i-Shkencave-Sociale-Departamenti-i-Shkencave-Politike.pdf>.

Character of the VV Model

Sovereignty as a Political Compass

VV has centered its identity on the idea of a state that decides on its own affairs, opposing the logic of endless compromise with Serbia and international paternalism.

It has based this political objective on the vital national interest, implementing laws and policies that have contributed not only to the extension of sovereignty to the north of the Republic, but also to the creation of a new image in international relations.

Social Justice as a Cause

With an emphasis on equality of opportunity, subsidies for young people, and public health, the model attempts to overcome the economy captured by the oligarchy.

Civic and Horizontal Democracy

VV promotes a political culture based less on closed party hierarchies and more on the mobilization of the citizen as an active actor.

New Political Divide

This model has created a new political divide – no longer just between left and right, but between the “old politics” of compromise, which paved the way for the attempt to annex northern Serbia on September 24, 2023, and the “new politics” of sovereignty and integrity. However, the tension between political realism with elements of idealism and extreme servile opportunism, a well-known school of the so-called elites that have been created in Kosova during almost a century of being a Serbian colony, dressed with the label of slandered realpolitik, remains the main challenge. Leadership: dialogue with Serbia, Euro-Atlantic integration, and maintaining stability.

Reflection on the Successes of VV

The success of VV is exerting an inspiring influence, demonstrating the possibility of a common pan-Albanian platform, which connects social issues with national ones. The growth of VV branches in the diaspora or interest in North Macedonia are signs of a project that goes beyond the borders of Kosova.

If VV manages to institutionalize its model as a form of effective and responsible governance, this means that Albanians can emerge from the cycle of endless transition and project themselves as a cohesive actor in the region. If it fails, the disappointment would be great and would strengthen the return of the old elites.

Return to Power – The Only Cause of the Opposition

The battle for the return of the old elites is extremely fierce. This goal has de facto already become the only cause of the opposition. Unfortunately, official Tirana is also supporting this cause. It goes without saying that Belgrade also supports this cause through the Serbian List.

A good part of the television stations in Pristina and Tirana have long been powerful speakers for this cause, quite openly.

From the morning until the late evening hours, television debates and news of their kind “boil” that have Prime Minister Kurti and VV as their subject of discussion. The Prime Minister, as Professor Agim Vinca expressed in an opinion piece, wants to be guillotined!

The established hegemony of this old class of Kosovar politics, as Gramsci would put it, had produced a kind of passive and active consensus whenever it was demanded of it by the centers of establishment, even when those demands contradicted the vital interest of the Republic and the Nation – the case of the Brussels Agreement [2013/15] - Zajednica and that of the demarcation of the border with Macedonia and Veuju, and with emphasis on that with Montenegro, are the most typical.

The return of this opposition to power, therefore, would be black news for Kosova and the Nation.

For Gramsci, the old that has returned is no longer the usual old, but it is transformed into a kind of monster.⁴ [3]

Three Possible Scenarios for the Future

The optimistic scenario: VV is consolidated in Kosova, the reforms bear fruit, and the model extends as political inspiration in the Albanian space, creating a new national cohesion.

Middle scenario: VV maintains political dominance, but faces internal constraints and international pressure, reducing the model to partial reforms and continued compromise. Pessimistic scenario: lack of concrete results and external challenges lead to a decline in popular support, bringing back the old elites and limiting the model to a failed experiment.

Political Culture – Part of Western Culture

In a long interview given to the London daily The Guardian, Greek historian Georgios Varouxakis, while reviewing his book, “The West: The History of an Idea,” at the beginning of the interview he recalls the philosopher Auguste Comte, who, according to him, may be the most ignored figure in the modern world. However, the historian reminds us, today he is remembered mainly for inspiring the motto “Ordem e Progresso” (Order and Progress) because it is quoted in practically every novel by the controversial French novelist, Michel Houellebecq.

While speaking about the commonality, the censorship that characterizes Western civilization, namely what distinguishes the West from other cultures, Varouxakis responds as follows: “Thinkers ranging from the anti-capitalist Trotskyist Cornelius Castoriadis to the liberal conservative Raymond Aron agree that what distinguishes the West is the capacity for self-criticism and self-correction. Throughout history there are governments that do terrible things, but then there are regenerative and corrective movements that come as a reaction to previous injustices.”⁵ [4]

This concept has made Western civilization here today, in this position it is, in relation to other civilizations, respectively cultures, and in the political sphere.

Albanian culture and civilization, and with it our political culture, is part of Western culture. As such, it has established the concept of self-criticism and self-correction since the beginning of the creation

⁴ Hare, Quntin. ed. Smith, Geofferey Noëll. ed. [1971] Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. New York, International Publishers, f. 10.

⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2025/sep/03/europe-is-the-core-america-joined-as-an-offshoot-the-historian-challenging-what-the-west-means>.

of Albanian state structures – the State of Arber, followed by that of the medieval principalities that will culminate with the creation of the State of Skanderbeg as a political value, to be followed by the League of Prizren and up to the oath of the KLA.

Meanwhile, not without reason, those concerned with national interest, in this transition from the declining World Order to the new one, whose dawn began with the war in Ukraine, are asking the legitimate question: does Albanian philosophy and political culture – including the one being cultivated in the capital of the Republic of Kosova – have the internal capacity to face the challenges of postmodern geopolitics through self-criticism and self-correction?

The Tradition of Self-Criticism in the West

One of the most distinctive characteristics of Western political philosophy, of which we Albanians are also a part, is the ability to self-evaluate and correct ourselves:

- Athenian democracy established the principle of isegoria (equal right of speech).
- Modern revolutions (American, French, etc.) created the conditions for challenging absolute power.
- Liberalism, social democracy, Marxist criticism, postmodernism – all are forms of self-criticism that within the West itself questioned its dogmas.

This internal capacity for systemic criticism is the basis that has given birth to political progress, human rights and the very idea of the EU as a peace project.

Cultivating Western Concepts of Self-criticism

In the last four years, in addition to us as active citizens of the Republic, Western specialized institutions have also highlighted a fact: Kosova as a small state has displayed a pure version of democratic self-criticism that is often lacking in large EU member states, blocked by bureaucracy and strong interests.

This fact can be seen in several parameters:

- **Criticism of Power:** The very existence of the VV and its populist/progressive approach is an example of institutionalized social self-criticism.
- **Self-correction:** Internal reform in institutions (e.g. in justice) is the way in which a society applies the Western principle of correcting mistakes without destroying the system.
- **Free Public Debate:** The discourse on the “3rd Republic” brings to the center the idea that every political order is temporary and open to revision. This is the essence of Western political culture.

Belgrade is encouraging local Serbs and the “sleeping bears” embedded in political parties and the entire justice system in Kosova to sabotage the basic institution of democracy – the Assembly, thus blocking the creation of institutions that emerge from the elections of September 9. With this act, Belgrade has managed to sabotage the critical political infrastructure for six months and has now tested the functionality of the Republic itself. As the country’s president warned, the relevant security institutions have identified a “pack” of “sleeping bears” who would be part of a coup. The hand of the

state is consequently acting, while the rule of law must identify and expose those who are violating the constitutional order and the future of the Republic – but based on facts.

The investigations into those who are already in court and will answer for espionage in favor of Serbia and those who, according to the suggestions of the Serbian Intelligence, have encouraged the establishment of illegal mosques, outside the control of the Islamic Community, or even the departure of our young people to foreign wars in favor of political Islam, or the hybrid war against the Government, have even revealed attempts at a political coup.

For this, alarm bells should be ringing and we should have a civic awareness movement for the situation we are facing as a society and as a new liberal democracy.

These segments of the Serbian and Russian intelligentsia recently tried something similar in France², throwing severed pig heads at the gates of mosques, with the aim of provoking the growth of the far right, sparking protests, and plunging the country into chaos.

In Greek tragedy, an interaction of this nature is called a tragic moment. The audience in ancient democracies should learn from the arrogance of the protagonists on stage. Europe was silent again, as if nothing had happened in Banjë [September 2023]. This is because contemporary Europe “lacks the capacity for self-awareness and the calmness to admit its mistakes and to describe the situation realistically,” as the famous Swiss publicist Georg Hesler would say.⁶ [5]

Consociational Elements in the Constitution

However, within the Constitution, a number of mechanisms of consociational democracy based on the Ahtisaari Plan are incorporated:

- **Guaranteed Representation of Minorities:** 20 seats reserved in the Assembly (10 for Serbs, 10 for other communities).
- **Veto on Essential Issues:** Laws affecting the vital interests of communities cannot be passed without their consent (Article 81).
- **Two Official Languages** (Albanian and Serbian).
- Mandatory participation of minorities in the government.
- International guarantee of community rights.

Basic Principles of Consociationalism (According to Lijphart)

Arend Lijphart is considered the founder of this theory.

- **“Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration”** (1977)

A seminal book, in which Lijphart clearly articulates the concept of consociational democracy for ethnically or religiously divided societies.

⁶ <https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/die-liberalen-demokratien-koennen-den-hybriden-krieg-gewinnen-aber-nur-wenn-sie-sich-an-ihre-eigenen-regeln-halten-ld.1900794>.

- **“Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries”** (1999; 2012)

A broad comparison of models of democracy, in which Lijphart distinguishes between majoritarian and consociational models.

- **Early Articles:** “Consociational Democracy” (1969) in World Politics – a classic article explaining the four basic principles.

The basic principles of consociationalism according to Lijphart are:

1. **Grand Coalition** – The inclusion of elites from all major groups in governance.
2. **Segmental Autonomy** – Ethnic/religious groups have a degree of self-government (cultural, educational, territorial).
3. **Proportional Representation** – In the administration, parliament, police, etc.
4. **Veto Right** – On vital issues of communities.

In the Western literature, one of the relevant sources, which talks about consociationalism and claims that in the case of Kosova this theory is applied to a significant extent, but which directly compares the consociationalism supposedly applicable in Kosova and Northern Ireland, is related to the chapter of the book *Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice*, edited by Michael Weller & Barbara Metzger.

The title of this part: “Post-Conflict Institutional Design in Kosova and Northern Ireland” focuses on the principles of power-sharing, proportional representation and consociational mechanisms in the Assemblies of Kosova and Northern Ireland.

This chapter is better suited to examining the realities of consociationalism in the context of Kosova, and would therefore be a more useful primary source for your purpose.

Meanwhile, John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary in their work entitled *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements* do not include separate chapters that specifically address Kosova. They mention in general terms that the cases treated are “relevant to divided countries such as Cyprus, Kosova, Macedonia, etc.”

The Modern State and Its Basic Elements

The modern state and its elements applied in the case of the creation of the second Albanian Republic in Southeast Europe – the Republic of Kosova, based on its Constitution, cannot be qualified as a “consociational state”.

In political theory, from Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, Max Weber to contemporary theories, the modern state has several basic elements:

The People – A human community that feels itself part of a common political order.

Territory – A geographical space defined by clear boundaries.

Sovereignty– Legitimate monopoly of violence (Weber), supreme authority over the territory and the people, without external interference.

Political and Legal Institutions– Representative, governing and judicial bodies that organize collective life.

International Recognition – In the modern era, functioning as a state is not complete without acceptance by the international community.

The authors who claimed and claim that Kosova is a consociational state seem to have been based on the political reality of the period before 2002, when the north of the Republic was completely under the control of Serbia and governed by the Serbian List, a proxy branch of Vučić's Serbian Progressive Party.

The application of the principles of the modern state in the case of the Republic of Kosova is now more crystallized. Sovereignty, the supreme authority over the territory and the people, without external interference, is now de facto also in the north.

Kosova, as the second Albanian Republic after Albania (1912), is the product of a combination of historical, political and international factors. Albania (1912) was the first Albanian state recognized in the international arena. Meanwhile, Kosova (2008) is the second Albanian state, born after a long resistance under Serbian colonialism and more recently under apartheid applied by Serbia [1989-1999], in the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, of course with the titanic war of the

minority KLA. At first glance, this fact creates a duality of Albanian statehood in the Balkans: two different states, one common nation. However, over time, this reality has opened the real political debate on the need to create the Albanian Federation and further its integration within the EU.

Let us now look at the elements of the modern state of Kosova.

People

Max Weber and modern theories emphasize the role of the political community in the establishment of the state. In Kosova, the absolute Albanian majority constitutes the core of the sovereign people. Historical experience – from the uprisings of the 1980s, the parallel state of the 1990s to the KLA war (1998–1999) – consolidated a distinct political identity of the Albanians of Kosova.

Meanwhile, minorities (Serbs, Bosniaks, Turks, Roma, etc.) are part of the state structure through special constitutional guarantees, reflecting the consociational element of the modern state imposed internationally. The population is an absolute Albanian majority (over 90% today).

Territory and Borders

The modern state is closely linked to the concept of a clearly defined territory. Kosova was created on the borders that were imposed on Kosova by the Yugoslav Federation [1974 Constitution].

The Constitution of the Republic of Kosova (2008) clearly states: “The Republic of Kosova is an independent, sovereign, democratic, unitary and indivisible state” (Article 1). This constitutes a rejection of any form of federalization or territorial division, despite the constant pressures for the creation of autonomous entities for the Serbian minority.

Sovereignty

In Weberian theory, the modern state has a “legitimate monopoly of violence” over territory. In the case of Kosova, this element is partial: sovereignty was declared in 2008, but the presence of UNMIK, EULEX and KFOR. Despite this reality, since February 14, 2021 Kosova has gradually extended sovereignty to its north.

The independence declared on February 17, 2008 is now a factual political reality. This sovereignty, however, is being challenged by Serbia through the Serbian List. But while on the ground it has lost the control it had, in the meantime, through the "sleeping bears" it is claiming to block the functioning of the Assembly after the elections of February 9, 2025 and the inauguration of the Kurti 3rd Government.

Institutions

Institutions are the hallmark of the modern state. Kosova has a republican-parliamentary system, with a president, an assembly, a government and courts. The constitution ensures proportional representation and participation of minorities in the executive, taking into account the consociational model described by Arend Lijphart. However, this system often turns into a blocking instrument due to the political use of the veto right by minorities.

If this blockade continues, then the way will be opened for the application of the 3rd Republic.

International Recognition

Recognition by the international community is a fundamental condition for the functioning of a modern state in the international system. Kosova has been recognized by 119 countries to date, including the US and most EU countries, but not by Russia, China and five EU countries.

The Challenge of Postmodern Geopolitics

Today, the West faces a world where authoritarian states (Russia, China) use technology, disinformation and integrated economics to challenge the liberal order. Meanwhile, internal crises (populism, quasi-sovereignty, exclusive nationalisms) undermine the foundations of liberal democracy.

In the meantime, we are eyewitnesses that postmodernity has brought about the fragmentation of truth (the era of “post-truth”), which weakens the political culture of rational debate.

In this context, Kosova is experiencing the most severe period of the Russian-Serbian hybrid war, which has as its objective its return under the Serbian-Russian zone of influence, if not its complete return under the Serbian boot, as it was from October 1912 until June 1999.

The concept of self-correction in this context helps the strategic orientation and promotion of the Third Republic. Therefore, the incumbent Government and, with emphasis, the incoming Kurti 3 Government must continue to build consolidated institutions (courts, media, universities) that continuously produce critical and alternative mechanisms. This is a weapon that is missing in autocratic societies, but also in those with significantly patriarchal political concepts, such as our society.

The current confrontation with the blockage of institutions, first of all the constitution of the Parliament and, later, the creation of the government, seems to have to do not only with the Serbian-Russian hybrid war, but also with the pace of geopolitical crises, which seems to be often faster than the

pace of democratic self-correction. Reaction takes time (consultation, elections, public debate), while authoritarian actors, oligarchs and Jesmen politicians act in a centralized and immediate manner.

Consequences in the Face of Postmodern Geopolitics

If Albanian society manages to preserve and cultivate and exercise in its relations with our partners [USA, EU, Great Britain...] the capacity for self-correction without being paralyzed by internal fragmentation, it, that is, our society, remains competitive and with a moral and institutional advantage.

Meanwhile, if self-criticism turns into self-immolation, respectively political suicide (total relativism, delegitimization of institutions, loss of social cohesion), then the Republic risks weakening from within, paving the way for external authoritarianisms.

It is a kind of evil that a good part of the leaders of the Kosova opposition prefer to be satisfied with the illusions and euphemisms that they have used and are using for a good five of Western diplomacy in relation to Serbia and the danger from its expansionist policies.

A leader who takes the courage and states that Kosova is not threatened by Serbia, alias by its illegal and parallel structures in Kosova, he clearly proves that he has elementary deficiencies in his political formation and, above all, has not managed to build in his political being even the necessary minimum of cognitive capacities for self-correction.

This quarrel is a success of Belgrade's propaganda and the hybrid war that the Serbian intelligentsia and those of its allies have exercised and continue to exercise in entire segments of our society.

The Government of Kosova, nor those who support it, would at all like to appear as warmongering factors, not only to our allies, but also to the opposition without a guiding compass since the Democratic Revolution of February 14, 2021. If the Prime Minister and other government officials describe Aleksandar Vučić, first and foremost in communication with foreign media and in confrontations with Western diplomats, such as he is - as a war criminal, and Serbia as a destabilizing factor in the region, our opposition, without a political compass for action in situations such as the one we are going through in this period of postmodern geopolitics, is lacking the courage to accept the Government's success in the north and to initiate projects that are beneficial and in the national interest, such as the establishment of military recruitment. Neither Memli Krasniqi, nor Lumir Abdixhiku, nor Ramush Haradinaj, have the stature of a politician, as did former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir (1898–1978).

Let us recall the fact that she led the Israeli government from 1969 to 1974 and was known as the "Iron Lady" of Israeli politics before this expression was attributed to Margaret Thatcher in Britain. During her time as prime minister, she made powerful decisions, especially during the Yom Kippur War (October 1973), when the Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria attacked Israel.

But, even when she went into opposition, her determination for military mobilization and her close communication with the United States were considered crucial for the survival of the Jewish state in that conflict and afterwards.

If we look at it through the eyes of geopolitical analysis, the "Serbian expansion" no longer appears as a purely territorial-military project, but as a hybrid strategy that aims to keep Serbian hegemony alive over neighboring areas, especially in Kosova, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. The expected consequences for Kosova and the region can be divided into several plans:

Political Dimension

In Kosova: Belgrade will continue to instrumentalize the Serbian List and the Serb-majority municipalities as mechanisms blocking state functionality.

The failure of the aggressive act of September 2023 to annex the north of the Republic has forced Belgrade to move to plan B, which means the implementation of the Community of Serbian Municipalities in accordance with the 2013/15 Agreement.

The project of the Association of Serbian Municipalities is seen as a link to impose substantial autonomy that violates sovereignty.

In the region: Serbia will use its ties with pro-Serbian parties in Montenegro and Bosnia to hinder Euro-Atlantic integration and to keep open the option of unification within the framework of the “Serbian World”.

Security Dimension

Hybrid Warfare: Serbia, with the support of Russia, is expected to increase the use of propaganda, disinformation and cyber operations to delegitimize the state of Kosova.

Controlled crises: Provocations in northern Kosova, road blockades or armed incidents will serve as a means of pressure on the West.

These measures were warned by the Serbian List in a statement related to education and health, which are considered among the largest sectors that continue to operate under the Serbian system. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Albin Kurti addressed the Kosova Serbs with a clear video message, affirming that the Kosova Government is committed to guaranteeing the Serbian minority equal access to common goods, warning that the parallel education and health system, financed by Serbia, is not sustainable.

He promised that these services would be integrated into a single system, in cooperation with the mayors, the EU, QUINT and KFOR. Nothing outside the logic of the Normalization Agreement agreed in Ohrid.

The reaction of the Serbian List, alias Belgrade, was immediate, since the LS acts as a subsidiary of Vučić's Party in Kosova. Through a declaration, they made public their position that they continue to consider parallel education and health as "pillars of the survival of the Serbian people", denying that these structures should be treated as they have been treated as part of the negotiations in Brussels and warned that they would "liberate the usurped municipalities in the north"!⁷[6]

Region: The risk of destabilizing Bosnia and weakening NATO in Montenegro and North Macedonia is part of the same strategy.

Clearly, today's Serbia does not necessarily aim for classic conquest, but rather for a prolonged, asymmetric and hybrid hegemonism, aimed at keeping the Kosova issue unresolved and hindering the region's integration into the EU/NATO.

⁷ <https://kallxo.com/uncategorized/rohde-pergenjeshtron-listen-serbe/>

The Third Republic as a Way Out

Kosova is now going through the real process of state formation through what will be known by history as the 3rd Republic.

If the 1st Republic (September 1991/2008) was a legal-political act of conditional independence; the 2nd Republic (2008–2020) turned into a state captured by post-war elites, clientelism and painful compromises; the 3rd Republic (from 2021 onwards) must be a republic of citizens, justice and equality, built on full sovereignty. It is trying to be a laboratory of democratic self-correction, which means the permanent fight against corruption; the full return of sovereignty to the north; the effort for civic equality beyond ethnic divisions; the resumption of politics as a public service, not as the privatization of institutions...

The “3rd Republic” is therefore seen by serious scholars as a federal threshold; it corrects the defects of the 2nd Republic (capture, compromises, vassalage); consolidates Kosova’s international subjectivity, giving weight to cooperation with Albania as two equal states, restores the national dimension in politics, but elaborated in a modern form – federal, democratic, European; prepares the institutional terrain for an Albanian Federation, presenting it as a model of stability in the region and not as a threat.

The “3rd Republic” consequently in Kosova does not end within its borders, but potentially opens the way for a broader national integration project – that of the Albanian Federation.

The 3rd Republic manages to consolidate: functional institutions, inviolable sovereignty, substantial democracy (not just formal), then it becomes a magnetic model for Albania and for Albanians in North Macedonia, Montenegro without excluding those in Serbia [Presevo, Bujanovac, Medoc and Sandzak]. This paves the way for a federal union, not through romantic nationalism, but on the basis of: economic integration, institutional cooperation, legal harmonization, joint international representation.

So, the Albanian Federation as a union of the two existing republics [political Albania and the Republic of Kosova] would be seen not as a violent project, but as a high level of Albanian democratic state-building within an integrated Europe.

For Albanians everywhere, the 3rd Republic is expected to become a model of democratic modernization that can also be reflected in Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and the Valley [Presevo, Bujanovac, Medoc] and certainly in Sandzak. See for this, the 3rd Republic can be considered an overture to the creation of the Albanian Federation.

Kosova is a model of state organization where power is not exercised on the basis of the classical democratic majority, but on its division among ethnic, religious or cultural groups.

This principle has not been imposed by the Ahtisaari Package either.

Therefore, this interpretation is simply dogmatic, based only on the literal reading of the norms, completely ignoring the philosophical-political and constitutional approach.

The “consociational state” is a model where power is compulsorily divided among communities to maintain peace [the case of Bosnia]. In the case of Bosnia, it has been described as a useful solution for multi-ethnic societies, but it often produces deadlock, fragmentation and the risk of political paralysis.

But Kosova is not such a case.

The condition that insists on qualifying Kosova as a "consociational state" has serious problems on two levels: either professional or political. In this specific case, I believe that a political interpretation is being expressed without a political basis.

The "3rd Republic" is not only the vision of an internal reform of Kosova. It is the first stage of a larger process, which opens the way for the Albanian Federation - a project similar to other European federalizations, which is based on consolidated sovereignty, deep democracy and national unity.

In this sense, the battle for the "3rd Republic" is not only Albin Kurti's political vision, but an existential test for the very idea of the modern state of Kosova.

Conclusions

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The "consociational state" is a model where power is compulsorily divided among communities to maintain peace [the case of Bosnia]. In the case of Bosnia, it has been described as a useful solution for multi-ethnic societies, but it often produces deadlock, fragmentation and the risk of political paralysis.

However, Kosova is not such a case.

- Serbia has not abandoned the use of force, but they now appear as controlled incidents, provocations on the ground, cyber operations and orchestrated propaganda. The alliance with Russia turns this front into a hybrid arena where the main goal is to delegitimize Kosova's statehood and weaken NATO's security architecture in the Western Balkans.

- The consequences of Serbia's postmodern geopolitics are obvious. Kosova faces constant pressure for painful compromises in dialogue; the region remains exposed to controlled crises; the Euro-Atlantic integration process is delayed. In this context, Albanians as a whole must articulate a common national strategy, strengthening the alliance with the US and the EU and consolidating the Kosova state as an irreversible factor. Only through this consolidation can the asymmetric hegemony that Serbia projects today be neutralized.

- The model inaugurated by the Vetëvendosje Movement marks a turning point in Kosova's political history: it is the first serious attempt to link political sovereignty with social justice and civic democracy. This de facto model is a clear break from the past and a real promotion of the Third Republic. If this model manages to be institutionalized and produce tangible results, Albanians in the region can be projected as a new, more united and credible actor in the Balkans. On the contrary, its failure would deepen the disillusionment of citizens and return Kosovar politics to the old spiral of compromise and corruption.

In other words, the future of Albanians will not be determined only by external circumstances, but also by their ability to produce a sustainable, just and authentic governance model. Vetëvendosje has opened a path; the challenge is whether it can keep it open and turn it into a common path for the entire Albanian nation.

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