



The Impact of China's Foreign Policy Evolution on the Decline of the Maoist Movement of the Shule Jawid in Afghanistan

Shakib Andisheh

Student of International Relations PhD, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran

Shakibandisheh@gmail.com

Reza Simbar

Professor, School of Political Science, Guilan, Rasht, Iran

Simbar@guilan.ir

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5111-1075>

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Abstract

The following article focuses on examining China's foreign policy evolution after the 1970s and its effects on the decline of the Maoist Movement of the Shula Jawid in Afghanistan. The emergence of left-wing ideological movements in Afghanistan coincides with the turbulent period of the Cold War and the geopolitical and geostrategic competitions of the hostile poles of that era, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The Chinese communist movement in Afghanistan weakened and declined in light of the changes in the paradigm of China's foreign policy from ideology-centric to economy-centric, and under the pressure of domestic political factors, it followed a definitive downward trend. In the 1970s, China, by adopting a radically different approach and placing itself in the market economy camp, determined a different fate for itself and for the movements affiliated with Maoist ideology at the global and regional levels. The adoption of an unconventional communist approach that brought China from an ideological state into the international economic flow during the Deng Xiaoping era. The main question of the current research is based on the following: What impact did the transformation in China's foreign policy paradigm have on the fate of the Chinese communist movement in Afghanistan? The main hypothesis of the research states that; the transformation of China's foreign policy from ideology to economic pragmatism after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, through the reduction of ideological support and the change in the calculations of the affiliated elites, was one of the main factors in the decline of the Maoist movement of the Shula Jawid in Afghanistan. In analyzing this issue, the theory of neoclassical realism, which emphasizes the primacy of interests over ideology, has been used. The descriptive research method and the data collection method have been organized in the form of library and documentary. The transformation in the logic paradigm of China's foreign policy and internal developments are the independent variables; the weakening and failure of the Maoist movement (Shula Jawid) in Afghanistan are the dependent variables.

Keyword: *Changing the Paradigm of China's Foreign Policy; Internal Developments; Maoist Organization Shula Jawid; Neoclassical Realism*

Introduction

The issue of the Maoist left in Afghanistan is not an exception to the rules governing ideological currents. Every ideological group in Afghanistan has had a similar experience almost in the same way. According to the logic of politics in Afghanistan, all sectors, areas and intellectual and ideological groups have been influenced by the views of their intellectual prophets and main ideologists in other countries and have acted and taken positions more radical than their original source. In the original source, the phenomena may be ideological, but a phenomenon called ideology is created and developed by an intellectual system in a specific country or geographical area and is not actually ideological but has a flexibility; Its phenomena and external manifestations may take on an ideological color and gloss. Those who are outside its origin or have less contact with it, or have less control over its intellectual system or system may understand it as a transhistorical ideology, an ideology that has transhistorical value and authority and is less subject to situational and historical fluctuations. Accordingly, the Maoist left, like the Islamists, the liberals, the Leninist left in Afghanistan, have all been subject to this logic. After the turn in the original origin and source has taken place, it has caused tremendous confusion and shock and caused contradictions and contradictions between those perceptions and beliefs and what has happened. The Maoists thought that the views that are considered a paradigm and an intellectual model in China are permanent and immutable, and on this basis they formed large alignments. But after the transformation and metamorphosis that took place in China, and everything moved towards economism and, consequently, reconciliation with the world of liberalism and the free market and the like, the Maoist leftist movements faced an unpredictable shock and experience; in this regard, they became more chaotic than before. A similar situation can be observed in Islamist groups, which they experienced from the addresses of neighboring countries or beyond, and were practically facing such and seasonal shocks. The two decades of experience of the democrats also say the same. Especially the new generation, who thought that the pioneers of this field paid attention to values with an essentialist view, actually had no practical commitment or moral obligation to those values, and as if those values were not permanent and permanent and were subject to the requirements of time and place. The Leninist movement in Afghanistan was no exception to this rule and had this unexpected experience, the consequences of which, unfortunately, the people, society, and conditions of Afghanistan had to pay. Therefore, the change in China from ideology to economism practically shows the fact that no ideology is actually an ideology. What is reflected is not reality. The founders and pioneers think and believe in those issues less.

Theoretical Framework

Neoclassical Realism

In neoclassical realism, foreign policy is the focus. As neorealists claim, foreign policy cannot be considered to be derived solely from systemic conditions. Neoclassical realism, which is also referred to as modified or modified realism, often accepts the concepts and principles of neorealism, but nevertheless adds new variables to the theory. Neoclassical realism believes that anarchy and the distribution of power alone cannot explain the behavior and power of a state. This theory is interested in explaining the foreign policy and decisions of a particular state and seeks to explain the desire for power based on a combination of individual or agency levels and structures. This theory believes that components such as the personality and understanding of leaders, the relationship between the state and society, and the interests of the state are also involved in explaining foreign policy. This theory believes that the capabilities and limitations of the international system are affected by the actions of states and their performance in the field of foreign policy. Important mediating variables include decision-makers' understanding of the distribution of power and the internal structure of countries. Aggressive neoclassicals such as Schuller believe that states seek to maximize their influence in the international environment. It is noteworthy that within the framework of neoclassical realism theory, there is a belief that the requirements and limitations of the international system do not directly affect foreign policy, but that mediating variables play a fundamental role. Although the balance of power in the international

environment and the anarchy of the international system are among the main factors in foreign policy-making; however, the understanding and perception of a country's leaders of these components and issues and the structure of the state, which mainly includes state-society relations, affect how foreign policy is designed. Another point is the cohesion or dispersion of elites in influencing foreign policy. In neoclassical realism, there is a complex relationship between system-level variables and foreign policy of states, but mainly independent variables, unit-level variables including domestic politics and leaders' perception and understanding of relative power and systemic conditions are considered as mediator variables and foreign policy of states is considered as dependent variable. States face major threats and opportunities in the regional and international environment, and unit-level variables limit or facilitate the ability of various states, including great powers and small states, to respond to systemic requirements. (Asadi, Ali Akbar, 245, 2009) Therefore, global politics can be analyzed based on the assumption that states are rational single actors who want to maximize their desired benefit. The context of states' activity (state of anarchy or anarchy) determines the content of their rationality. The behavior of states can only be explained in terms of the structure of the international system itself, because states are rational and in any given situation there is only one desirable behavioral option for them to process. The state is also the dominant and natural unit of analysis in international relations (whether political or economic). States are also single and integrated actors whose only motivation for behavior is considerations of national interest. States seek relative goals, not absolute ones (High-Kline, 2011). From the neoclassical perspective, the system does not directly influence behavior. Here, attention is paid to perceptual factors on the one hand and to state structures on the other. Zakaria's attention to subjective factors is seen in the concept of perceptual shock, according to which certain events can cause politicians to suddenly become aware of long-term effects and trends related to power. (Zakaria 1998:11) The power of states is not necessarily always available in its entirety, and it is the state structures that provide or do not provide politicians with the necessary tools to exercise power. As a result, national capabilities do not translate directly into state behavior, and attention should be paid to state power, which is different from national power. State power is more important than national power because it constitutes the part of national power that the government can use to achieve its goals and shows how easily decision-makers can achieve their goals. (Zakaria 1998:9) Of course, it should be noted that offensive realists pay less attention to unit-level variables than defensive realists. But in general, according to Zakaria, any increase in state power and national power leads to more expansionist foreign policies. (Moshirzadeh, 131, 1401) Realism and neo-realism have dominated the academic literature on great powers, and there is no doubt that any discussion of power must pay attention to this approach. As Mearsheimer says: "Great powers are determined by their relative military capabilities. To achieve great power status, a state must have sufficient military assets to fight a serious battle in a full-scale conventional war against the most powerful state in the world." From a realist perspective, a state can have great power status, but it is unlikely to join the great power club unless it has the requisite economic and military power and can gain acceptance from the club. (Bull. 1977:201)

International and domestic contexts of the emergence of political movements in Afghanistan .The 1950s and 1960s marked the beginning of the awakening of young and educated groups and the emergence of political parties in Afghanistan. With the continuous development of the state education network and the expansion of the state apparatus, educated groups were attracted to global ideologies. Dr. Sayed Asker Mousavi, a researcher at Oxford University in Britain, calls these years the years of political revival in Afghanistan. The 1960s were very sensitive years politically, even in Europe; in Latin American countries and in Africa, it was the end of the colonial period. These developments, in whatever form and with the censorship we had in Afghanistan, which blacked out half of the books and tore out the pages, in whatever form it was, passed through this censorship and reached Afghanistan. The 1960s were the years of political revival in Afghanistan. French researcher Olivier Rove, who has written many works on Afghanistan, is of the opinion that the ideas of the counter-revolution were a means for intellectuals to reach the government officials of this country. These intellectuals could not access high-ranking government positions, which were all in the hands of the royal aristocracy. Intellectuals became disillusioned with their social development and, as a result, turned to revolutionary ideologies in which

the state was considered the agent of social change. In the 1960s, there were only two ideologies on the market: Marxism and Islamism. Of course, the reasons for turning to these ideologies are complex, but among them, we can point to the influence and external factor as a result of Afghan intellectuals going abroad, including Islamic scholars or young officers studying in the Soviet Union. It was abroad that these intellectuals became familiar with and accepted universal ideologies. Political groups and parties were established one after another and continued to operate in secret or semi-secret ways. For example, the New Democratic Movement, whose publication organ was *Sholeh Javid*, later became known as *Sholeh Javidiha*, or the Afghan Social Democratic Movement, whose press organ was *Afghan Mellat*, later became known as *Afghan Mellatiha*. One of the important left movements during this period was the *Sholeh Javid Movement* or the *New Democratic Organization*, which, according to Farooq Farani, a researcher and one of the former *Sholeh Javid* activists, was founded as an independent left movement in the early 1960s under the influence of the differences between China and the Soviet Union: (Tanin, 133, 1384) Both communist countries claimed to lead the oppressed classes in the world, and China was seen to be closer to Afghanistan due to the lack of an industrial working class and the existence of peasant and agricultural classes. At the beginning of the 1940s, various ideas emerged on a global level due to divisions in the international Marxist movement of the world, which also gained influence in Afghanistan. The *Sholeh Javid* movement, which was initially called the *New Democratic Movement*, began its first nucleus formation in 1343 AH, and began its activities in Afghanistan in competition with other parties and groups. In 1344, after the famous demonstrations of the 3rd of Aqrab (Aban), the same nuclei that had started the discussion together to create an organization were able to establish the *Progressive Youth Organization*. Its initiators were Akram Yari and Sadeq Yari, Rahim Mahmoudi and Hadi Mahmoudi, and a number of other people who later became more famous. After the publication of the monthly *Sholeh Javid* in 1347 AH and the arrest of the leadership members of the *Progressive Youth Organization* or the *New Democratic Movement*, the tendency of the people and intellectuals towards *Sholeh Javid* increased greatly, and this movement entered the political struggle as a large and widespread organization. (Ibid., 134) The late historian of the country, Mir Mohammad Sediq Farhang, also discusses the emergence of this movement in his book. In 1968, the newspaper *Sholeh Javid* was founded under the patronage of Dr. Abdur Rahim Mahmoudi, brother of Dr. Abdur Rahman Mahmoudi, as an organ of the *New Democratic Party*. This party, which followed the Marxist ideology of the Peking line and was known in the community as *Sholeh Javid*, did not have a centralized administration, and its leaders, such as Mohammad Osman, known as Landi, Mohammad Akram and Mohammad Sadiq Yari from the noble Hazara family of Jaghori, and Dr. Abdur Rahim Mahmoudi and Dr. Abdur Hadi Mahmoudi, at the same time fought with the government and other parties, especially the two branches of the *People's Democratic Party*, and sometimes fought with each other within the party. (Farhang Sediq, 515, 1367) The lack of active organization and the crisis of thought and thought had dominated this movement from the very beginning, which later became evident in its behavior and major decision-making. Especially when China's political path separated from ideology and joined the camp of economic liberalism, the *Sholeh* movement was caught in chaos, which certainly severely damaged its capacity for reconstruction. Communism of the Soviet Union and China were not the only dominant political ideology at that time. After the emergence of communist groups, according to Fazal Ghani Mujadidi, a researcher in the United States and a former activist of the *Muslim Youth Movement* at Kabul University, some of the youth became familiar with works and books that were published by the central office of the *Muslim Brotherhood* and the *Jamaat-e-Islami* of Pakistan, and the aim of which was to spread Islamic ideology in Afghanistan. In the late 1960s, the *Muslim Brotherhood* movement, whose central office was abroad at that time, tried to translate the books of the *Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic Movement* into Pashto and Persian. These books were translated in Beirut and Kuwait and came to Afghanistan. Islamic ideas were also transferred to Afghanistan through Pakistan through the movement of Maulana Maududi, based on political parties, and the Muslim youth of Afghanistan came under the influence of Islamic ideas, especially Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Qutb. (Tanin, 134, 1384) The Afghan society of that time remained the same.

The Rise and Fall of the Maoist Left in Afghanistan

Shoala Javid was published in 1968 as the intellectual organ of the Maoist movement in Afghanistan. Its emergence was the result of a combination of domestic and international factors. The ratification of the 1963 constitution and the beginning of the decade of democracy caused political, press, and academic activities to become somewhat more free and provided the ground for the publication of social publications. Dissatisfaction with the country's social and economic conditions, such as widespread poverty, social inequality, injustice, and economic backwardness, led to the inclination of some intellectuals and students towards revolutionary ideologies. Along with that, the growth of universities and student movements, especially Kabul University, turned them into centers of political and ideological debates, and many supporters of Shoala Javid emerged from among students and professors. (Tanin, 1938, 134) The aforementioned organization succeeded in obtaining a license to operate in the 1940s with the emergence of a semi-democratic atmosphere of the monarchy. However, due to its inflexible method, which mostly reflected the personal views of the leadership and emphasized violent revolution and armed war, despite its initial popularity, it was unable to gain a strong social base and influence the subsequent political situation and realities of Afghanistan. (<http://www.afghan-german.com>) In addition to international factors such as the Sino-Soviet conflict and the ideological gap between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, Maoist movements emerged in many countries around the world, including Afghanistan. Despite this, the influence of Mao Zedong's ideas and his emphasis on peasant revolution, armed struggle, and mass mobilization were attractive to some intellectuals and educated Afghans who saw their country as a rural society. The impact of the revolutionary movements of the 1960s and the success of the Chinese Revolution, the Vietnam War, and the spread of anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America inspired the Afghan left. And the spread of Marxist and Maoist literature, which had spread to the intellectual and academic community of Afghanistan through the translation and publication of works, led to greater familiarity and attraction to this ideology. Ultimately, the differences at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 led to changes in the communist parties of the world, and its consequences spread to other leftist movements in the world. The Shula Jawid stood up to defend China's positions and the ideas of Maoist Don. (Spenta, 2017, 47) In conclusion, it can be said that the emergence of the Shula Jawid coincided with internal conditions such as open political space, the growth of the student movement and social discontent, and international developments such as the split between China and the Soviet Union, the influence of Maoist ideas, and the wave of revolutionary movements of the 1960s. Together, these factors provided the basis for the formation of one of the most important Maoist movements in Afghanistan. The Shula Jawid (Shoala Javid) was one of the most important political and ideological movements of the 1940s in Afghanistan. Some active organizations, including the Afghan Maoist Organization, the Afghanistan Liberation Organization, the Communist Party (Maoist Chinese script) of Afghanistan, the Afghan Workers' Organization (MLM), the Revolutionary Youth Movement of Afghanistan, and the Struggle Workers' Core of Afghanistan, still adhere to its ideology, and it has a wide range of supporters inside and outside the country (<https://www.rahrawan.com/>). The Shula Jawid movement was a reaction to the specific political, social, and cultural conditions of Afghanistan during the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah. This movement is particularly important because it emerged at a time when many Afghans were seeking fundamental changes in their society. Although the movement failed to achieve its goals at that time, its effects on the political history of Afghanistan and subsequent developments, especially following the fall of Zahir Shah's government and the emergence of the communist regime in Afghanistan, were very significant. The Progressive Youth Organization and the movement led by it (Shula Jawid) with the slogan of forced revolution and rejection of parliamentarism soon took root among intellectuals and became a powerful nationwide movement in Afghanistan. This organization, which believed in Marxism, Leninism, and Mao's thought, at that time evaluated Afghanistan as a semi-feudal and semi-capitalist society and had accepted the strategy of armed struggle to surround the cities through the countryside and achieve a new democratic society as its minimum program to gain power. (<http://www.afghanmaug.net/content/view/1524/31/>) Due to the organization's inflexible method of

changing China's foreign policy from ideology to economic pragmatism, they were also unable to analyze international conditions and understand the factors that changed China's foreign policy.

Conceptual model of the emergence of the Maoist left in Afghanistan

Internal factors	International factors
- o Relatively open political atmosphere of the Shah's decade of democracy - o Social and economic discontent - o Growth of universities and students - o Activity of intellectuals	- o Sino-Soviet split - o Maoist influence - o World revolutionary movements - o Spread of Marxist literature

Foreign Policy Reforms

Since 1949, China's foreign policy has experienced four strategic turns. The alliance with the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, the collapse of the alliance with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, the reform and open door policy program in the 1980s, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. However, the alliance with the Soviet Union with the death of Stalin, ideological differences, intensifying leadership competition, the complexity of the alliance, and China's attempt to lead the communist camp were the grounds for this break. (Marku, 2019) Yazdan Pham) The latest turn in China's foreign policy occurred with the implementation of the reform and open door policy program. The second generation of Chinese leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping, changed the social contract of the state-building process in this country. The basis of the legitimacy of the political system changed from revolutionism to developmentism. Promoting economic development became the most important factor in legitimizing the Communist Party's monopoly on power, and Deng Xiaoping's thoughts in the form of the duality of "peace and development" provided new foundations for the country's foreign policy (Ezra. 2013, Yazdan Pham). Previously, the Chinese Communist Party's understanding of the international situation had led it to evaluate the nature of the international system in a confrontational way, and in this regard, China's policy supported the leftist movements in Africa as well as Chinese interventions in East Asian conflicts during the Mao era. (Bahrami, 2011, 18) This transformation helped weaken foreign Maoism and subsequently contribute to China's development. It seems that the Chinese have been intensely focused on their domestic and national goals in the past thirty years. Deng Xiaoping said thirty years ago that in order to become strong, rich, and influential, China needs a long period of internal peace and external peace. This phrase is engraved in the minds of all politicians and producers of wealth and power in China. (Foreign Policy 2011'43) The Chinese have prioritized their priorities with unparalleled care and diligence, not seeking to resolve global issues, but rather to focus on China and making it stronger. The Chinese have not destroyed their political system or abandoned their culture, but have accepted the logic of how to become stronger in the existing international system and have gradually begun to play a role, even change its game. The most basic definition of power is to set the agenda for others. Today, China is praised for its different image, growing economic and military power, expanding influence, distinctive diplomatic voice, and increasing participation in regional issues and its stances on the world stage. (64 David Shambaugh) And this can be used as a model for others to follow.

Factors Affecting the Paradigm Change in China's Foreign Policy

Sinologists believe that the transformation of China's foreign policy began in the late 1970s. This transformation, especially after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, when the main priority of Chinese leaders was no longer the export of revolution or the ideological goals of the Mao era, but rather the maintenance of a stable international environment for economic growth, capital attraction, technology, and national modernization, which they analyze in the framework of China's grand strategy. (Goldstein, 2005) The following factors are the predecessors of the transformation of China's foreign policy.

1. Mao's death: The developments that occurred after Mao Zedong's death caused some changes to occur. In 1982, the Communist Party eliminated the position of party chairman and replaced it with the position of general secretary, which had less power and influence. Therefore, by starting the reforms, the new leaders achieved one of their goals, which was to eliminate any personality cult of the country's leaders. Deng's goal was to prevent the re-emergence of the rule of Kame himself and the sacred head of the party and the people. Deng adopted a method in which all power and authority was distributed among China's top leaders. (Kohkan Alireza, 16, 2008) This development placed China in the ranks of countries with a long-term approach to the future and directed theories of power control from individual decision-making to theoretical support and consultative foundations. As stated in the 16th Congress, our completely new path relies on the following factors: relying on internal development, relying on opening up markets, relying on institutional innovation, relying on economic globalization instead of isolation, and relying on reciprocity and mutual benefits with other countries in order to win and win in new relationships. This new path of China's peaceful rise has been profitable for China for twenty-three years. It was also stated that the reforms and opening up achieved in the past two years are the result of a changed mindset. Now China only pays attention to internal development and transformation without considering achieving its goals through other means. (Zheng Bijian, 2004, 7) Despite the turbulent world after the Cold War, China, aware that its limited national power and strategic position did not allow it to exert sufficient influence, pursued the Taoguang Yanhui policy. Concealing its capabilities, focusing on strengthening national power, and adhering to the time set by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s, which was successfully pursued by maintaining cool-bloodedness and avoiding ideological confrontations. (Suisheng ZHAO, 102) The results of this strategy are commendable for both China and the world.

2. The difference with Moscow Perhaps one of the main and most important differences between the ideas of Russian and Chinese Marxism was the perception of the countryside and the city in the matter of revolution and struggle (Bahareh Samazmand, 2011, 2006). The Chinese communist perspective on foreign affairs is influenced by a mixture of historical, psychological, ideological and economic currents. In 1960, during the Bucharest Conference (before the establishment of China's new foreign policy, which was based on the principle of peaceful coexistence in 1971), Khrushchev criticized the Chinese delegation for emphasizing the principle of peaceful coexistence in domestic and foreign policy. By defending the Soviet perspective on international policy that coexistence should not be separated from revolutionary and armed operations, he actually rejected the Chinese perspective that believed that war between states was not inevitable and that sometimes the transition from capitalism to socialism could be peaceful. At present, the main issue is the defense of world peace, and the conflict between imperialists threatens it. questioned and practically made the Sino-Soviet dispute public. (Pusha, 2004) In the new era, China abandoned the warlike characteristics of the old era, because the development policies of the new leaders needed at least twenty years of a calm and stable atmosphere. Therefore, even between 1978 and 1989, China's attitude towards the Soviet threat did not change. In the new era, China made great efforts to enter into international organizations that carry out economic activities. Although its membership in the World Trade Organization created problems for the country in the short term, the hope of its leaders is that this will lead to benefits and high economic growth in the long term. In general, it can be said that China's foreign policy avoids any kind of tension, especially with the main players on the international stage. Perhaps the country's mild behavior in international crises can be evaluated in this regard. (Kohkan Alireza, 18, 2008) The role and impact of various factors such as Mao's death, the international space and conditions, hostility towards the Soviet Union, and most importantly, the emergence and understanding of Chinese transformational leaders were able to manage the space and opportunities for China's future and create goals in line with the international system and the transformation of the global economy. Politics in employing the interests and thoughts of leaders was placed on the path of development of the country.

3. Pressure of the international system Setting a goal in foreign policy is primarily dependent on having a correct understanding of national capabilities and environmental constraints (international or regional). (Seifzadeh 2005, 11) The international system is one of the factors affecting the foreign policy of all

countries. Power and interests after the end of World War II were among the issues that attracted the attention of the pioneers of foreign policy change in China. The generation after Mao immediately took pragmatic economic measures and distanced themselves from ideology and exported the revolution. International conditions and opportunities, despite internal agreement, were able to accelerate this process. Because the developments showed that a shift in power had occurred and countries that did not have access to various tools and sources of power, such as the economy, were deprived of global influence. Therefore, the new Chinese leadership did not want to be economically isolated and completely surrounded by their one-sided political ideals and continue to remain alien to global markets and international economic relations. (Karimfard, 2021, 80) China's membership in international institutions and organizations has increased dramatically in the post-Mao era. The relative number of transregional international governmental organizations that China is a member of, compared to a number of industrial powers and India, one of the most diplomatically active developing countries, shows over time. (Johnston, 12) In the current international system, foreign policy has become a function of the domestic system of countries and is not considered as an independent variable. It seems that over the past three decades, foreign policy has become a lever for increasing national wealth not only among industrial countries but also among developing and emerging countries. The power of other countries is not measured in terms of territorial size but in increasing national power through improving GDP and export capacity. Among them, China is one of the leading countries in the world that has been able to gain a special status at the international level by increasing its economic power and will become a pole of the world's bipolar system in the near future. China's foreign policy is at the disposal of its domestic politics and criticism. (Sari' al-Qalam, 455, 1402) The opportunities created during the Cold War doubled the role and effects of the economy in political and international relations and equations for China, and this helped it to successfully follow the path of development by changing its approach from ideology to economic pragmatism and prioritizing national interests over ideology and transnationalism, using a faster-than-imagined learning method. The global political economy system, by exerting pressure on China, has caused repeated reforms in the constitution, development programs, and economic and political structures in China. The PRC Constitutions, (1978, 1982, 2004, 2017) Now, as a result of the structural changes carried out in China, having common interests with other countries is a strategic principle in the basic structure of this country, which has also caused a change in its foreign policy. (Meybadi, 2007, 19) Today, China, in its interaction with the global economic system, distances itself from any kind of support for ideological currents and acts in line with strengthening global interaction and taking advantage of the economic opportunities of the region and the world. After 1980 to 2000, China gradually became more cooperative and beneficial to international rules by participating in international institutions. (Johnston, 2008) Subsequently, China's change in outlook is more profit-seeking and opportunistic than ideological.

4. Domestic Elite Perception The perception and understanding of the Chinese elite was shaped by Robert Glipin's statement. According to him, realism theory and the shift in international relations towards international political economy are shaping the future order of international relations. (Buzan.139) During Mao's rule (1949-1976), China's foreign policy was largely organized around ideology. This orientation initially led Beijing to prioritize its relations with Moscow. It also played a role in China's decision to enter the Korean War. Over time, and especially during the Cultural Revolution, domestic turmoil and dissatisfaction with Moscow disrupted China's foreign policy, paving the way for President Nixon to seek de-escalation with Chairman Mao in 1972. (Hass Ryan, Dsviid, 2) This provided China with the opportunity to seize the opportunity of international developments and manage development-orientedly. What plays a role and influence on this scale is the understanding and consensus of the Chinese elite on the path of development and the priority of national interests over ideological tendencies. The fundamental turn of China's foreign policy at the end of Mao's life and under the management of Chou En-lai, who realized that Mao wanted all the light on himself, turned all the spotlights on Mao to meet his psychological needs and then fundamentally established important steps in the fundamental turn of China's foreign and domestic policies in an innovative way. China's foreign policy in the two comparative periods of 1965 and 1985 is not in the form of two approaches but rather fundamental changes that can be analyzed. (Sari' al-Qalam, 246, 1402) As sources of power, the Chinese

elite placed what was in the form of national interests and the development of the country in new lines of transformation and new strategies. In this view, foreign policy was defined as subordinate to national and economic interests. And any ideological attention to the outside was practically abandoned. Xiaoping believed that China should abandon its efforts to lead the Third World. Because China's development opportunities would be lost. Because China needed at least half a century of peace in the surrounding environment. Therefore, Beijing should focus on improving the living standards of the Chinese people and modernize in the four areas of science and technology, agriculture, industry, and national defense to become a comprehensive power. (Evens, 1997:92) Bahrami Moghadam) The great architect of the transformation in China, Chuen Lai, at the end of Mao's life, tried to bring the Communist Party with him in a complex way and prepared the groundwork for the economic transformation that Deng Xiaoping later facilitated. Chuen Lai did the important political work. China moved to the economic paradigm in the late 1970s and thus made fundamental changes in its foreign policy. China was once a pillar of the struggle against the West and capitalism, but an objective examination of the world situation and a deep understanding of the lives of the Chinese people led the government and the Communist Party to create a new way to become powerful without shaking the structure of power and authority. Currently, China's private sector has a capital of \$ 2 trillion and has a strategic cooperation with the Communist Party and the central government to advance its goals. The Chinese have become very rich in the past 25 years and have even upset the economic balance of the world, to the extent that one of the main causes of the Western economic crisis in 2008 is the gradual enrichment of the Chinese. Chinese leaders realized that it is impossible to have a hungry nation and expect a temporary effect on the world stage. It is impossible to not produce national wealth and yet gain respect among nations. It is impossible to keep a nation of over a billion people satisfied with beans and rice. In fact, the West rules the world with financial and technological power, and China cannot become at least an Asian power without observing this rule. (Sari' al-Qalam, 29, 2009) This transformation in the intellectual dimension of the elite and the determination of a grand strategy to enhance China's economic and political status became the source of great changes. By breaking away from ideological attachments, China was able to undergo constructive and influential changes in the domestic and international environment in a short period of time. As Shambaugh explains in the fourth chapter of his book, the Chinese Communist Party no longer relies mainly on ideology, as it did during the Mao era, and gains its legitimacy from economic growth, improved living standards, and government effectiveness. (Danid Shambaugh, 2021) and its reflection affected a large part of China-region relations. Tony Blair may have aged twenty years during his first term as Prime Minister of England, but with a plan and action, he was re-elected as Prime Minister and, by making principled plans for the people of England, he repels the sabotage of the other side. Feelings and emotions are in the realm of the family, not in the realm of the state and the country's grand politics. Chuen Lai was the Premier of China during Mao's era. Chuen Lai was an extremely complex and world-renowned person, who understood the problems of the Chinese revolution and was not an epic person. He concluded that Mao was a person who was not very familiar with the issues of progress, development, expertise, science and the strengthening of China. He was a person who was more of a symbolic figure for the leadership of China. Chuen Lai did not seek to eliminate Mao, but rather satisfied Mao's psychological needs to maintain power. He said that everyone should pay attention to Mao, and Chuen Lai focused his energy on creating institutions to make China stronger. For example, he established institutions to train physicists, chemists and mathematicians, which became the foundations of China's nuclear power in later years. Some may think that Deng Xiaoping is the leader of the new China. However, if it were not for Chuen Lai's work, Deng Xiaoping would not have been able to create the next waves. Chuen Lai inserted his own agenda into Mao's agenda. He drew a circle within a circle and tried to move it forward. Over time, he succeeded in increasing the number of common and overlapping parts of the circle.

5. Domestic Conditions Today, the Chinese middle class has gained a deeper awareness and understanding of the world and social and political conditions, and for a large number of them, the official ideology of their country, which is essentially the product of the thoughts of people like Marx, Lenin, and Mao, is considered obsolete or dead. The Tiananmen Movement was a manifestation of this transformation in Chinese society. (Qanbarlu, 2014, 129) The perception of Chinese public opinion is that

they are strongly protective of the status quo and averse to the past. Mao's death and the rise of Deng Xiaoping coincided with a rupture in the context, namely the growing disillusionment and social dissatisfaction caused by the Cultural Revolution at the domestic level, the fading of the Cold War, the emergence of neoliberal globalization, and the industrial migration of newly industrialized economies to peripheral economies at the international level. (Feroozabadi, 67) On the other hand, Mao's Cultural Revolution caused millions of people to die and had devastating consequences for the economic life of millions of Chinese. (Bahrami Moghadam, 2018, 135) The shift in China's foreign policy from ideology-centric to economy-centric was formulated according to long-term interests, subject to strategic rationality. Rationality at the state level refers to the question of how foreign policy decision-makers work together and side by side to set goals and find a strategy to achieve them. It is these individuals - not the state itself - who make the decisions. Therefore, the rationality of a government depends on how the opinions of its key policymakers are put together. (Mearsheimer, 34, 1402) Therefore, we consider a government to be rational when its strategies are consistent with valid theories and the product of consultation. Rational policymakers are theory-driven. They use more valid theories to understand the world logically and choose the best way to achieve their goals. Rational governments collect the views of different policymakers in two ways: 1. Free, rigorous, and explicit discussions and debates; 2. The choice that the final decision-maker makes; Rational policymakers use valid theories to accurately understand the world and its practical mechanisms. Since there is a deep connection between theory and policy, decision-makers who apply these theories will ultimately enact policies that are rational and at the same time realistic. Rational governments also collect the opinions of key policymakers through consultation. At the state level, it is consultation that is the main pillar of the rational process of collecting votes. Conversely, an irrational state is one that is irrational in the process of collecting votes that leads to the selection of a particular policy. This occurs when some in the decision-making group resort to silence, coercion, suppression, lies, or concealment of information. On the other hand, an irrational state is one that, regardless of the nature of the vote-gathering process, is based on an invalid theory or has no theory at all. According to our definition of "strategic rationality," it includes states whose policies are based on valid theories and are the product of a deliberative process for decision-making. (Mearsheimer, 38, 1402) Based on the above discussion, the evolution and behavior of China's foreign policy in the 1970s was certainly the product of processes of valid theories and expert consultations. The only way to confront opponents is through effort, effort, diligence, planning, and human rationality. Developments and decisions are the product of a process of consultation and theory, both of which can be clearly seen in China's changing foreign policy.

Changes in the internal structure:

To achieve the set goals of the new foreign policy, China needed legal and strategic foundations on which to rely to free itself from the trap of pursuing past ideological policies and continue the path of development and connection with the economic world without internal challenges and obstacles. Following the communist revolution, China considered itself the center of the world revolution and provided ideological support to the anti-Soviet and Maoist movements in various countries. Its relationship with the international system was hostile and based on a confrontational Marxist ideological basis. However, after the rise of Deng Xiaoping, China's foreign policy priority changed from exporting the revolution to economic development. In 1976, the Maoist Group of Four, who had been at the peak of state power until Mao's death, were arrested and imprisoned, and they were never heard from again. The "revisionists" returned to power under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and were ready in early 1978 to put China on the path of "market socialism" or socialism with Chinese characteristics. Support for foreign Maoist groups declined, and state-to-state relations were replaced by ideological relations with revolutionary movements. Many Maoist movements around the world felt that they had lost their international support. This change certainly affected the Afghan Maoists, as they were part of the global anti-Soviet intellectual network. On the other hand, after Mao's death and Deng Xiaoping's rise to power, the Sholeh movement no longer considered China Maoist and distanced itself from it. (Goldner-Lernen, 2024, 25) With regard to the content of the discussions on the drafting of the Chinese constitution in

1982, the following points are emphasized. This is while China subsequently gained its legitimacy not from the export of revolution and ideological mobilization, but from pragmatic governance and economic development. (Danid Shambaugh, 2021) The 1982 Constitution does not directly mention support for external Maoist movements, but several of its principles show the framework of China's foreign and ideological policy after the reforms, which the Chinese government after Mao effectively distanced itself from the export of the Maoist revolution.

1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit

5. Peaceful coexistence According to the preamble to the 1982 Constitution of China, the country pursues an independent foreign policy and regulates its relations with other countries based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence mentioned above. These principles have been introduced as the basis of China's diplomatic and economic relations with other countries. This orientation practically meant abandoning Mao's policy of global revolution. China (People's Republic of)'s Constitution of 1982 with Amendments through 2004) What can be understood from the above is the formulation of a completely new strategy focused on domestic affairs and respect for mutual relations between countries. This approach of China after 1982 shows that the country's foreign policy looks at international relations through the economy, trade and national interests and indicates a serious renunciation of exporting revolution and supporting ideological currents related to Maoism. (Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China 2019) Based on China's new foreign policy, China's power and energy were focused on serving national interests and prioritizing economy over ideology. Trade relations with the world and the free market were important directions that the elites focused their thoughts on and created theoretical and legal foundations to achieve them. Considering China's developments, the result of the gradual process of constitutional reform in this country is that this law has clearly left the communist system behind and has also distanced itself from Mao's anti-capitalist system. And it has moved forward through the liberalization of foreign investment in all areas of the Chinese economy. (The PRC Constitutions, 2017 Article 18) Pour Ahmadi)

Farewell to Ideology

The new leaders abandoned the Maoist content of the ruling ideology, such as uninterrupted revolution and class struggle. China's reformist leaders always called for the creation of a spiritual civilization and gradually replaced communist ideas with nationalism. (Ibid., 15) Also, after Mao's death and Deng Xiaoping's rise to power in 1978, China's foreign policy shifted towards supporting domestic economic growth. Deng believed that China should focus its energy on its own development, and doing so would require unnecessary measures. What seemed unnecessary in the new foreign policy were ideologies and revolutionary measures that had no place in the new foreign policy. (Hass Ryan, DSvid, 2) This issue caused China to seek economic opportunities and development rather than exporting revolution; in this regard, a sense of security and comfort arose for those who were previously considered rivals. In China's subsequent developments, the support and cooperation of the Western world played a key role. These changes, based on Hu Jintao's proposal to ensure peace in Asia, included the following:

1. Increasing mutual trust
2. Deepening economic cooperation
3. Increasing cultural exchanges
4. Transparency policy (Raja Qaiser Ahmad, 2014, 11) Following these developments, China defined a path for itself that ruled out any ideological confrontation and put economic interaction on its agenda. Abandoning the idea of universalism The fate of communism in China with the death of Mao in 1977 caused the last generation of revolutionaries to leave the stage. And younger members rose to important positions. Some of these new leaders will almost certainly defend beliefs and ideas that their predecessors rejected. But what exactly these ideas might be and how they might change the nature of Chinese

communism remains to be seen. The developments in the current world show that today's Marxists have by no means benefited only from socialist or communist theories and practices. There have been and will be many non-Marxist voices in the socialist chorus. In fact, the non-Marxist forms of socialism are so numerous that it is difficult to provide a complete list of them, and a detailed description of each is even more difficult. (Ball Trans, 2007, 252) What was expressed in the state of transformation and change based on the priority of resources over ideology in China was rapid and alternative developments that, according to Alvin Toffler, are changing the face of the world faster than contemporary man can imagine. The Chinese, realizing the end of ideology and the emergence of alternatives such as economy, market, competition, and development earlier than others, have pathologically diagnosed and used the method of creative transformation to permanently rebuild themselves.

(Analytical-Conceptual Model) The Mechanism of the Impact of China's Foreign Policy Evolution on the Decline of the Shula Jawid

- o Evolution of Chinese foreign policy - o Priority of economic interests - o Reduction of ideological export - o (Reduction of support for foreign Maoism)	- o Weakening of ideological authority - o Decreasing the intellectual legitimacy of the Shula Jawid - o The ideological crisis of the organization	- o Ideological differences - strategic differences - o Internal developments, splits - o Decreased organizational cohesion - o Decline of the Shula Jawid organization
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This research seeks to illustrate the key dynamics or stages of the movement through the theoretical model presented in this section as an allegorical example. It shows the impact of China's changing foreign policy, priorities such as interests and economics, weakening of the organization's ideological authority, strategic differences, internal developments, reduced organizational cohesion, and the decline of the organization.

Mechanism of the impact of China's foreign policy transformation on the decline of the Shula Jawid

1. Decrease in the intellectual legitimacy of Maoism: With its economic and commercial approach, China does not support Maoist revolutionary discourses. In this regard, the Shula Jawid movement becomes a purely historical and academic phenomenon. China (People's Republic of)'s Constitution of 1982 with Amendments through 2004) China's change in approach to relying on the constitution, which reflected the priority of internal affairs and non-interference in the affairs of countries, certainly included a decrease in the legitimacy of foreign Maoist movements.

2. Ideological crisis: Some leaders believed that China had distanced itself from revolutionary principles, while others continued to emphasize following the Beijing line. China's new policies also caused further fragmentation. The loss of the inspiring model, part of the intellectual legitimacy of the Afghan Maoists stemmed from the success of the Chinese revolution. When China entered into extensive diplomatic relations with the West, this image was weakened for some. It also had an impact on the ideological unity of the Afghan Maoists, which damaged some of their appeal. (Publication, "Sapidhe Dam", 2005, p. 5, www.sapidadam.com) The subsequent ideological crisis meant that they could no longer stand tall against their political rivals.

3. Internal disputes and organizational crisis: One of the important and effective consequences of China's change in foreign policy on the Maoist communist movement in Afghanistan was the creation of deep internal disputes. Subsequently, this movement could not operate freely and openly, and both legal and social paths were limited for it, and it was forced to turn to underground and secret activities. Political and international developments, including the change in China's foreign policy approach and the withdrawal

from exporting ideology and the lack of support for Maoist movements towards economic pragmatism and national interests, as well as the rise to power of the Moscow-affiliated communist political party, created a dark future for this organization. Several political meetings and gatherings to determine a new strategy for the struggle and revival of the organization's activities were deprived of their achievements due to the lack of coordination and collusion of the elites, and the members of the movement were left in a state of despair. (Sholay Javid, No. 4, 2011) Internal disputes within the organization ultimately led to the split and division into several Maoist leftist groups in the country. The existence of differences of opinion and the failure to reach a consensus and collective agreement in the face of the real situation ultimately caused the organization to be deprived of any kind of activity in the country's society in 1973 after the coup of Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan and the establishment of the first republic in Afghanistan. A number of its leaders, including Engineer Osman Zandani, who later pledged to kiss the last stone of politics and throw it to the ground. (Payam Aftab, 2011) The continuing crisis of legitimacy and work in the organization left little hope for the interest and enthusiasm of individuals in the organization. This became an opportunity for rival movements and, on the other hand, provided a more open space for the Leninist left.

4. Reduction in recruitment, splits: With the decline of the collective movement, the activists of Sholeh Javid expressed their existence by publishing a pamphlet under the title: By Rejecting Opportunism on the Path of the Red Revolution Forward; This group was known as the Critics, which was later renamed the Revolutionary Group of the Peoples of Afghanistan. The leadership of this group was held by Dr. Faiz Ahmad, a medical graduate. The group was renamed the Afghan People's Liberation Organization in 1980. Abdul Majid Kalakani later joined the Afghan People's Revolutionary Group. During the Revolutionary Group's conference, a group called the Cadres, led by Dr. Akif, split from the Revolutionary Group and formed the Procurement Organization, a movement to fight for the establishment of a communist party. This movement published a magazine called Akhgar. The leaders of this organization renounced Maoist beliefs and became known as supporters of the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha. A number of cadres of this organization returned to Kabul from abroad at the beginning of the Haft Saur coup to continue the struggle, were arrested, and executed after grueling torture. Several of them stayed in Europe and gave up political struggle. (Spenta, 2017, 46) But the most influential event that shattered the Shula Jawid movement was the illness of Akramyari, as the leader and pioneer of this intellectual movement. (Mousavi, 2010, 76) The movement subsequently fell into chaos, disarray, and a multitude of centers, which led to fragmentation and a lack of interest among young people towards it.

Internal factors affecting the collapse of the Shula Jawid organization

Due to the method of struggle of this organization, the political space and at the same time the social environment of the society for their entry became more and more limited day by day, and the number of their competitors and enemies among other ideologies increased. For example, in 1351, a severe conflict occurred between the Shula and the currents of Muslim youth, and a number of people who were supporters of the opposing currents were killed. The outcome of the demonstrations brought more internal confrontation than the realization of the ideological goals of the movement. This method showed a small and fresh experience of party and organizational activities and has lessons for understanding and comprehending the future. Studies show that the change in China's foreign policy is one of the main factors weakening the Shula Jawid movement. The cessation of China's ideological support had consequences for the Shula Jawid organization. The Afghan Maoists believe that the reason for the internal divisions and collapse of the Shula Jawid is that the group grew and formed based on unilateral external activities and lacked attention to internal organizational formation. They believe that there were different theories and methods within the organization that were never reviewed and placed in a healthy focus. In this regard, this lack of intellectual coordination led to violence and fragmentation. The extremism and violence of the Maoists, which had placed them in opposition to all groups from the Moscow-affiliated communists to Islamic and nationalist groups and forces, on the one hand, and Beijing's withdrawal from organizing and supporting Maoist groups in third world countries on the other,

caused internal tensions to arise among the members of the Shula Jawid leadership, which led to a split in 1960. (Publication, "Sapidhe Dam", 2005, p. 5, www.sapidadam.com). Therefore, this movement has not had a clear definition of reality, and most of its leaders, considering the new global conditions and current changes in the modern world, have distanced themselves from Mao's thought and preferred to live in the West. In addition, the organization's harsh and inflexible methods to achieve its goal accelerated the decline of the organization, such as:

1. Emphasis on Violent Revolution

The usual method of struggle of the Shula movement was to hold more demonstrations and use intense and hateful literature in its slogans against the government and other political and party factions of the country. This movement began its struggles on May 11, 1968, by celebrating Labor Day in an inflexible and radical way, and expressed its identity in the name of the Progressive Youth Organization. Fiery speeches were given by the founders and elites. (Site Khorasan, publication, 29 September -1393) All these efforts towards the realization of the ideological goals of the movement arose from the thoughts of the organization's elites who had understood the path of struggle from a distance. However, the objective and subjective conditions of Afghanistan were very different due to the nature of the Maoist left ideology. Also, in the subsequent demonstrations in 1949, they put pressure on the leftist movements affiliated with the Soviet Union and criticized any relationship with Moscow and compromise with the capitalist system. As Akram Yari defended in his remarks the principled and unyielding position of the Sholeh organization against the people's opportunists. He proudly recalled the war and the continuation of opposition to them with hope as one of the ways to attract the wider masses. (Notes of Akram Yari, 14, 1392) In general, their method and approach to struggle were in opposition to all groups and the royal government, which in itself did not show a very positive outlook for the organization. As Dr. Spanta states: On August 14, 1979, the revolutionary group of the Afghan people, the "Shula Jawid Movement", along with several other political parties, launched an uprising in Kabul. This uprising was suppressed, and some of the supporters of this group were arrested and executed. Among those arrested was Dr. Faiz Ahmad, the leader of this group, who escaped from the Sadatar prison the day after his arrest. (Spanta, 2017, 71)

2. Historical Delay

One of the most important reasons for the failure of Maoism in Afghanistan is the historical delay in their presence on the political and cultural scenes. Although some Maoists claim that the first communist movement in Afghanistan was launched by them. Some historical documents state that the origin of Maoism in Afghanistan is derived from the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Given that the Chinese Revolution was victorious 32 years after the Russian Socialist Revolution, it is clear that Maoism also entered the international scene later, and therefore the Maoists appeared in Afghanistan after the Moscow-affiliated communists (<http://www.payam-afstab.com/fa/doc/news/112>). Therefore, the delay in the presence of one of the causes and factors of the failure of communism in Afghanistan was that they failed in social contexts and from other sides to secure a strategic and long-term relationship with China. (Payam Aftab Information Site <http://www.payam-afstab.com/fa/doc/news/112>) In the early 1970s and the lack of leadership, the movement moved towards becoming a group. Despite several meetings and discussions at organizational levels, it failed to devise a comprehensive strategy acceptable to the members and elites. (Shoala Javid, 2014, 11) The inability to have a comprehensive and collective thought that would have the general agreement of the elites caused the movement to be unable to continue its life and chose the path of marginalization.

3. People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

When the Soviet-affiliated People's Democratic Party came to power in Afghanistan, the first movement to fall victim to its policies was the hanging of the leaders of the Sholeh organization and its organizational collapse by the government. The leaders of this organization, most of whom were university professors and intellectuals seeking justice, were executed by the People's Democratic Party. Also, in February 1981, the secret Liberation Organization (Sholeh Javid) was destroyed along with its printing house, radio station, and its premises. This organization had extensive connections with professors, students, and office workers in Kabul and other cities of Afghanistan. 99 civil servants, 60 students and schoolchildren, 9 teachers, 99 workers, a salesman and businessman, and ten army personnel, totaling 990 people, were arrested. (<http://www.afghan-german.net/upload/elmi-bibliothek/h-simab-KGB-in-Afghanistan.pdf>) Before the emergence of the anti-Soviet Mujahideen, the government at the time had a deep enmity with the Sholeh organization. Finally, a few months after the coup of 7 Saur 1357, Akram Yari was arrested by the communist government of the time, but was soon released. However, in the month of Hot 1357, he was arrested again and imprisoned. In the list of approximately 4,500 people published by the Hasht Sobh newspaper, it was found that number 4383 belonged to Akram Yari, who was killed on 7 Qaus 1358, during the last days of Hafizullah Amin's rule (1387 statement, Revolutionary Organization of Afghanistan, Mizan). The prominent role of the Soviet-affiliated government in Afghanistan, following internal and Russian orders and instructions, in creating pressure against the Maoist left of Afghanistan is expressed in this way. In Herat alone in 1981, they destroyed 99 commanders of the resistance groups against the Soviet Union in one operation. (Vasili Mitrokhi, 2002) Regarding the reasons for the failure of the Chinese communist movement, there is also the view that Chinese-Afghan Marxism was generally incapable of opening the historical deadlock of Afghanistan and could not present a political plan that would attract public trust. It remained anti-state and never managed to criticize and address the characteristics such as totalitarianism, intolerance, limited horizons, and lack of human perspective in the general culture of Afghanistan. The followers of this ideology, in particular, were unable to establish a reasonable and logical relationship between the ideals they cherished and the social reality. For half a century, all left and right governments have been criticized and criticized by the Shula Jawid. More than half a century has passed since the life of Afghan Maoism. Except for some members of this movement who have revised their views and converted to liberalism and have been given a piece - albeit insignificant - of the power pie, Afghan Maoism has been a marginal movement in general and can be said to have played little positive or negative role in the political power structure of contemporary Afghanistan. (Ali, Amiri, Site, BBC, Publication, 5-Jedi-2013) The existence of authoritarian governments in the past, despite the weakness and inability of society in terms of economy and culture, caused ideological currents in the country to create records for themselves, due to the lack of study and copying of the manifesto of the export ideology, which had bad and irreparable results for the country and its future.

Table of the degree of influence of various factors on the weakness and decline of the Maoist left movement in Afghanistan

Factor	Historical documents	Impact
o Social base - popular	The traditional and religious nature of Afghan society was in conflict with the secular Maoist ideology.	Medium
o Political prohibition and repression by various governments, royal, republican, communist,	o Blocking of activities o Going underground o Imprisonment and execution of some leaders	Very much
o The shift in foreign policy paradigm from ideology to economic pragmatism following Mao's death	o Prioritize economic interests o Reduce the export of ideology o Reduce support for foreign Maoism o Weaken China's ideological authority	A lot

o Cultural and religious conditions of Afghan society	o Lack of educated people in society o Lack of comprehensive familiarity with modern parties	Medium
o Lack of consensus among leaders and internal divisions	o Party fragmentation o Lack of unified leadership	Medium
o Long wars after 1979	o The organization's long absence from developments	Medium
o The emergence and spread of Islamist movements	o Military confrontation and repression	Medium

According to the discussions of the present article, the failure of the Maoist left in Afghanistan (Shula Jawid) was the result of a combination of domestic and international factors such as: (weak social base, internal divisions, inability to organize, government repression, China's shift from ideology-based policy to economic pragmatism, and ultimately the lack of foreign support. However, the movement had a significant impact on some of the intellectual left movements in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s.

4. The decline of the organization:

As the Sholeh Javid magazine says: The slowness and lack of planning of the Central Committee of the Progressive Youth Organization took control and as a result, it came to dominate the entire organization. The dominance of this method over the Progressive Youth Organization caused the organization to disintegrate from within and the trend to move towards fragmentation day by day. On the other hand, the cynicism of the ranks of the organization and the trend towards some individuals and the widespread hostile propaganda by them against each other, alienated a large number of individuals from the ranks of the organization and the New Democratic Trend from the organization and made the ground more favorable for their failure than before. The Progressive Youth Organization, in a situation where it was overcome by internal weakness and external pressures, tried to improve its collapsing situation by holding its fourth congress in the fall of 1972. However, instead of finding a solution to the organization's problems, the holding of this congress actually pushed the organization towards complete collapse (Shoale Javid, 2014, 11). Because the organization had lost its capacity to revive and rebuild due to internal weakness, and otherwise it could not have appeared in the power game.

Conclusion:

The transformation of China's foreign policy and its consequences for the Shula Jawid organization demonstrate the ideological and strategic changes in China and the internal transformations of this organization, which represent a meaningful process. Since its inception, the Shula Jawid organization had inspired part of its political and intellectual identity from Maoism and the experience of the 1949 Chinese Revolution. In this respect, China was acceptable to the organization not only as a friendly country but also as an ideological reference and a model for revolutionary struggle. However, with the beginning of economic reforms and the change in the direction of China's foreign policy, the country gradually distanced itself from active support for revolutionary and Maoist movements and prioritized economic development, political stability, and cooperation with governments. This development challenged the theoretical foundations of many Maoist movements in the world, including the Shula Jawid organization. In this situation, the question arose whether China was a true representative of Mao's thought or had deviated from the path. The different answers to this question led to deep disagreements among the organization's members and leaders. The identity crisis resulting from this situation was not just a simple disagreement, but also related to the redefinition of the organization's goals, methods of struggle, and even its nature. Some emphasized maintaining loyalty to the traditional principles of Maoism, while others called for a review of the intellectual foundations and political strategies. In addition to this factor, the political developments in Afghanistan also played an important role in exacerbating the crisis. The communist coup, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, civil

wars, the emergence of Islamist groups, and the changing political priorities of Afghan society made the space for Maoist movements more limited than before. As a result, the Shula Jawid organization faced not only internal crises but also external pressures. The combination of these factors led to a decrease in the organization's ability to mobilize forces, a weakening of its social base, and a limitation of its political role. Therefore, the decline of the Shula Jawid organization should be considered the product and product of internal and external factors. However, the evolution of China's foreign policy as the most important ideological reference of this movement played a decisive role in the beginning and intensification of the identity crisis. This evolution caused the organization to falter, ideological differences deepened, and the process of splitting and dispersion quickly took place. The study of Sholeh Javid shows that political and ideological movements that depend on a foreign model for their legitimacy and identity are highly vulnerable to changes in that model. Sholeh Javid's experience is a clear example of the impact of international developments on the fate of domestic political movements and the importance of organizational intellectual and ideological independence in the continuation of the political life of movements. Future research can use political identity theories or discourse analysis to study the process of reconstruction or collapse of left movements in Afghanistan. For future discussions and future research, there are many cases that can be investigated that can be beneficial for researchers and scholars.

└ Comparing Sholeh Javid with other Maoist movements in the world ┘ The role of internal Afghan factors in the decline of Sholeh Javid? ┘ Are the leftist movements of Afghanistan capable of rebuilding their identity? ┘ Functional and epistemological challenges of leftist movements in Afghanistan?

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