The Collapse of Multilayer Predation and the Emergence of a Monolithic Leviathan

Tuobang Li

doi:10.47814/ijssrr.v9i1.3198

Tuobang Li Independent Researcher, Zhaoqing, Guangdong, China

DOI: https://doi.org/10.47814/ijssrr.v9i1.3198

Keywords: Game Theory, Multilayer Predation, Leviathan

Abstract

This paper constructs a multilayer recursive game model to demonstrate that in a rule vacuum environment, hierarchical predatory structures inevitably collapse into a monolithic political strongman system due to the conflict between exponentially growing rent dissipation and the rigidity of bottom-level survival constraints. We propose that the rise of a monolithic political strongman is essentially an "algorithmic entropy reduction" achieved through forceful means by the system to counteract the "informational entropy increase" generated by multilayer agency. However, the order gained at the expense of social complexity results in the stagnation of social evolutionary functions.

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